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Terrorism and the 
Resilience of Cities
arge American cities have thrived in recent decades despite
  the challenges of crime, congestion, and poverty. Can 
terrorism jeopardize this vitality? The September 11 attacks 
were targeted at two major U.S. cities. Although the loss of life 
and the destruction were unprecedented, in one key respect the 
attacks were typical: terrorism in the developed world has 
usually been concentrated against the financial and political 
centers of power. The attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon have forced Americans to confront the fact that 
to live or work in a major city is to be at greater risk of large-
scale terrorism.
In this article, we consider what these risks, and the public 
perception of them, mean for cities in general and for the 
future of New York City in particular. We begin by examining 
the question of why cities exist at all. Only by answering this 
important question can we think more clearly about the long-
run effects of terrorism on cities. 
The economic analysis of cities is an active area of research, 
and we draw on that work for our study. The consensus among 
economists is that there are a number of plausible explanations, 
or models, for the existence of cities. Accordingly, we apply two 
economic geography models—the “labor pooling” and “core 
periphery” models—to our analysis of the existence of cities 
and terrorism’s effect on them. Our use of these two different 
theoretical models gives a broad perspective to our study.
Although the models differ, the conclusions we draw from 
them are similar. Namely, the very forces that lead to city 
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• The September 11 attacks highlighted the 
vulnerability of major U.S. cities to terrorism, 
leading some observers to question whether 
cities will continue to thrive despite the risk
of further assaults.
• Current economic theory provides a strong 
basis for arguing that cities can withstand 
terrorist attacks and other catastrophes. The 
same forces that are thought to lead to the 
formation of cities—namely, the gains derived 
from the proximity of firms to markets, 
suppliers, and a large labor pool—will help
to preserve cities in the face of an attack.
• To be sure, the ongoing threat of terrorism—a 
kind of “tax” on a city’s firms or residents that 
reflects the costs of fear, higher insurance 
premiums, and increased security spending—
may temper the economic forces that sustain 
cities. Nevertheless, the available evidence 
suggests that the size of this tax is too small 
to undermine the viability of New York and 
other large cities.
James Harrigan and Philippe Martin
L
98 Terrorism and the Resilience of Cities
formation also enable cities to be highly resilient in the face of 
catastrophes such as terrorist attacks, because they create an 
impetus for the concentration of economic activity that is very 
difficult to overcome. In addition, although a continued threat 
of terrorism in large cities may make them a somewhat less 
attractive place to live and conduct business, terrorism is quite 
unlikely to cause massive changes in the structure of urban life. 
New York City in particular is likely to continue to thrive 
despite any ongoing threat of terrorist activity.
Why Do Cities Exist 
in the First Place?
A city is a dense concentration of people and economic activity. 
In an open society, where people and businesses are free to 
locate wherever they like, such concentrations can persist only 
if they are beneficial to the people and firms that locate there. 
In the language of economists, the existence of cities is part of 
a market equilibrium, where the benefits of being in a city are at 
least as large as the costs. Similarly, for those who do not reside 
in cities, the benefits of being outside a city must exceed the 
costs.
The study of the existence of cities in equilibrium is the 
province of economic geography. A general feature of 
economic geography models is that they include strong forces 
of circular causality: since there are benefits to being in cities, 
workers and firms move there, which increases the benefits of 
being in the city, causing more workers and firms to move 
there, and so on. An implication of circular causality is that, 
once formed, cities are highly robust. The large gains from 
being in a city mean that firms and workers are reluctant to 
forgo those gains even if the costs of being there rise. 
What are the economic benefits of being in a city? For one, 
moving goods and people across space is costly in terms of time 
and money, and being in a city economizes on these transport 
costs. Transport cost benefits can be broken down further 
according to three forces:
• Market access—firms benefit from being close to large 
concentrations of consumers. For goods producers, this 
proximity is often a matter of economizing on shipping 
costs, while for many service firms (hotels, restaurants, 
most retailers), it is simply impossible to sell to distant 
consumers. 
• Supplier access—producers benefit from quick access 
to a wide range of inputs. This access gives firms an 
incentive to locate near their suppliers and, since nearby 
suppliers are favored by producers, suppliers have an 
incentive to locate near their customers. 
• Cost of living—consumers benefit from being near 
producers, since they will have less expensive access to a 
wide range of goods and services.
These three forces work together to create an incentive for 
agglomeration. A final force is the fact that workers have to live 
near their jobs. Because workers are also consumers, by coming 
together in a single location, firms can sell to each other as 
suppliers and to each other’s employees as consumers. 
Economists have worked hard to tidy up the loose ends of this 
argument, but the intuition is clear enough: when there are 
transportation costs, agglomeration is an equilibrium.
An alternative, but complementary, reason for cities is that 
their existence makes it easier for workers and firms to find 
each other. With a large pool of workers to choose from, 
employers can quickly hire the people they need. Similarly, 
with many potential employers, workers can find a job quickly. 
If firms’ demand for labor fluctuates over time, this labor 
market pooling effect can be particularly valuable for both 
firms and workers: when a firm lays off workers, those workers 
can find new jobs more easily if they live in a big city than if they 
live in an isolated company town; conversely, when a firm is 
booming, it can more easily lure new workers if a large pool of 
job seekers exists. 
An appealing aspect of the labor market pooling motivation 
for cities is that it does not rely on transport costs, except to the 
extent that workers need to live near their jobs. Even as 
economic activity becomes more “weightless” and easy to 
transmit over space at low cost, the labor market pooling 
motivation remains undimmed.
To see the possible relevance of labor market pooling to 
New York City, consider the financial services sector—the 
backbone of the city’s economy and tax base. Financial services 
have evolved to the point where face-to-face interaction 
between customers and producers is almost completely 
unnecessary for many transactions, and access to a wide range 
of produced inputs is equally irrelevant.1 Yet financial services 
firms remain in New York because that is where their workers 
In the language of economists, the 
existence of cities is part of a market 
equilibrium, where the benefits of being in 
a city are at least as large as the costs.
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are, and their workers are there because the firms are there. As 
long as some work needs to be done by groups of workers 
located in the same place, economic activity cannot be 
completely dispersed, and agglomeration will persist even if 
final sales can be transported at zero cost.2
However, along with the benefits of being in a city come 
costs. The most obvious is congestion: cities are crowded and 
urban land prices are high. Another drawback for firms 
locating in a city is the heightened competition that arises from 
locating in an area where there are already many firms selling 
similar products. In equilibrium, firms and workers balance 
the benefits and costs of locating in a city, and the size and 
durability of cities depends on this trade-off.
Once a city is formed, the cost-benefit calculations that led 
to its creation may no longer be relevant. This is because the 
existence of the city is in itself a reason for its persistence. In 
particular, the level of costs that could lead a city to erode is 
generally far higher than the costs sufficient to discourage city 
formation in the first place. In short, there is an agglomeration 
rent: once workers and firms are in a city, costs and conditions 
can deteriorate substantially without tempting them to leave.3
How Does Terrorism Affect a City?
The impact of September 11 on New York City was not limited 
to the death and destruction in Lower Manhattan. The cost of 
doing business in New York has risen, even for workers and 
firms quite distant from the disaster site.
Some of these costs include:
• slower and less efficient transportation, because of the 
physical disruption of transport links and the delays 
caused by increased security,
• greater security spending,
• higher insurance premiums,
• the emotional toll on workers who fear future attacks.
In brief, the ongoing costs imposed by September 11 are 
significant. Indeed, some of these costs are now being borne 
in many large U.S. cities, as citizens have seen the damage 
inflicted on New York and are taking cautionary steps in 
response. The effect of these increased costs is to make cities 
less attractive—an effect that will last as long as the threat of 
terrorism persists.
Having established that cities exist because of the decisions 
of millions of independent workers and businesses, we return 
to our central question: what are the implications of terrorism 
for the future of cities? To answer this question, we turn to two 
specific models of the existence of cities, and examine the 
effects of terrorism in these models. The models illustrate the 
robustness of cities: they suggest that even in the face of the 
large and continuing costs associated with terrorism, cities are 
likely to continue to thrive. 
The Labor Pooling Model
For our first model, we use a modified version of a simple 
model of labor market pooling introduced in Krugman (1991). 
The details of the model are given in the appendix, but the 
economic intuition is explained here.
The ingredients of the model are firms, workers, and 
locations. Firms choose their location to maximize profits, 
while workers move to where wages are highest. In addition to 
labor, firms use land to produce their output, and land is in 
fixed and equal supply in each of two locations, A and B.
Firms face uncertainty, and dealing with this uncertainty is 
an important part of their business plans. The uncertainty can 
reflect fluctuations in demand or in productivity, and it is 
important to theorize that the uncertainty is imperfectly 
correlated across firms: when some firms face high demand 
and/or productivity, other firms face low demand and/or 
productivity. 
Because of the fluctuations facing firms, wages will fluctuate 
in each location: when many firms face high demand or have 
high productivity, wages will be bid up, and wages will fall 
when labor demand is low. But the variability in wages in a 
given location will be lower the more firms are in that location. 
This relationship follows from the law of averages: firm-specific 
positive and negative fluctuations are more likely to cancel each 
other out if there are many firms. In this case, firms that benefit 
from high demand or high productivity will be able to hire new 
workers without bidding up wages. This would not be true if 
there are few firms in the same location, or if firms’ shocks are 
correlated. Hence, a larger number of firms and more diversity 
in a location will raise average profits in that location. In brief, 
firms want to locate where other firms are to reduce 
fluctuations in wages.
Firms want to locate where other firms are 
to reduce fluctuations in wages.
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Land is in fixed supply in each location, and since each firm 
needs land as well as labor, the price of land is higher where 
there are more firms. This introduces a trade-off for firms: by 
locating where other firms are concentrated, firms benefit from 
a larger labor supply, but they must pay higher rents.
Turning to the decisions of workers, we assume that they 
care only about average wages.4 As a result, if average wages are 
the same in two locations, workers will be indifferent about 
where they live. Since wages are determined by supply and 
demand, wages will be equal in each location if the share of 
workers equals the share of firms in each location. We illustrate 
this relationship in Exhibit 1: let  be the share of firms in 
location A, and  be the share of workers in location A. The 
45 degree line is where  so that wages are equalized, 
and we label the 45 degree line WW to indicate this equality. 
Above WW, , so the share of firms in A is higher than 
the share of workers; this means that wages are higher in A than 
in B. This would lead workers to migrate from B to A, and the 
opposite holds for points below WW. These potential 
migrations are indicated by the arrows in the exhibit. Thus, 
with free migration, WW is the labor market equilibrium 
condition. 
The location choice for firms is a bit more complicated, 
since it is based on three considerations: the average level of 
wages, the variability of wages, and the cost of land. In 
equilibrium, it must be the case that average profits are the 
same in each location, otherwise firms would move to the more 
profitable location. This trade-off is illustrated in Exhibit 2, 
which, like Exhibit 1, has location A’s share of firms, , and 
share of workers, , on the two axes. As we detail in the 
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appendix, the   curve shows the combinations of  and  
that are consistent with equal average profits in each location. 
Starting at the symmetric point where there are equal numbers 
of workers in each location , we note that 
there are two possibilities:
• If the labor pooling motive is weak and/or if the price of 
land responds strongly to the number of firms, the  
curve has a slope of less than 1, illustrated as .
• If the labor pooling motive is strong and/or if the price 
of land does not respond much to the number of firms, 
the  curve has a slope that is initially greater than 1, 
but then flattens out, as illustrated by .
In either case, points below  are combinations of  and 
 such that profits are higher in A than in B, so that firms will 
move from B to A, with the opposite holding for points above 
WW. These potential movements of firms are indicated by the 
arrows in Exhibit 2. 
With the labor market and firm location equilibrium 
conditions established, we can now determine the overall 
equilibrium location of workers and firms. This is where the 
WW and  curves intersect. The case where  is fairly flat 
at  is not very relevant, since it implies that the 
two locations are symmetric and no city emerges, so instead we 
focus on the case where  is steep at  
(Exhibit 3). There are two equilibria in this case, but the 
symmetric one at  is unstable: any slight 
increase in  or  away from this point will be self-
reinforcing, as indicated by the direction of the arrows, and the 
economy will converge to the asymmetric equilibrium where 
ππ λF λL
λF λL 1 2⁄= =( )
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Note: We denote the equilibrium location of firms and workers as
L*and , respectively. F *
one location is larger than the other ( ). At 
this equilibrium, location A (the city) has high land prices and 
firms benefit from labor pooling, while firms in location B (the 
nonurban location) forgo the benefits of labor pooling in 
exchange for lower land costs.5
Thus, in the labor pooling model, cities arise because the 
benefits to firms of a large and stable labor supply balance the 
high rents that must be paid in crowded locations.
The Effects of Terrorism 
in the Labor Pooling Model
As we have observed, terrorism targeted against large cities has 
two effects: the loss of life and the destruction associated with 
the attacks, and the costs of coping with any ongoing terrorist 
activity.
Perhaps surprisingly, a onetime incident in itself has no 
long-run effect on the size of cities in the labor pooling model. 
This is because even massive physical damage has no 
permanent effect on the underlying forces leading to the 
concentration of economic activity in a single location. 
Evidence to support our view is offered by Davis and Weinstein 
(forthcoming), who study the impact of the U.S. bombing of 
Japanese cities in 1944-45. They show that the damage to cities 
was both huge and very uneven, with some cities (such as 
λF∗ λL∗ 1 2⁄= =
Tokyo and Hiroshima) deeply affected and others relatively 
unaffected. However, fifty years later, the relative size of cities 
in Japan was the same as it was before the war; accordingly, the 
forces leading to city formation were left intact after the 
bombing stopped.
Nevertheless, ongoing costs can change the trade-off 
between concentration and dispersion, potentially leading to 
changes in the equilibrium amount of concentration. In the 
labor pooling model, terrorism in cities can directly affect firms 
through an increase in the cost of doing business, and affect 
workers through an increase in the perceived risk of living and 
working there. Because the decisions of firms determine local 
labor demand, any direct effect of terrorism on firms has an 
indirect effect on workers. Similarly, the direct effect of 
terrorism on workers’ location decisions has an effect on firms 
because it influences local labor supply.
We first interpret the ongoing costs of terrorism as a cost 
that must be borne by firms that locate in the city. These costs 
include higher insurance premiums, direct spending on 
increased security, and reduced productivity associated with 
security-induced delays. We refer to these costs as a terror tax: 
the ongoing cost of doing business in a city threatened by 
terrorism.6 Unlike a typical tax, this tax detracts from firm 
profits and worker income without funding improvements in 
infrastructure or services. Firms can avoid the terror tax by 
relocating to a smaller city, and it is this trade-off between 
security and agglomeration benefits that we analyze.
As Exhibit 4 shows, the initial equilibrium is at point 1, and 
terrorism shifts down the  curve to . Firms leave the city 
to avoid the costs related to terrorism, wages in the city fall in 
response to the fall in labor demand, and the equilibrium 
moves to point 2. At that point, however, wages are lower in the 
city so workers leave as well. The new equilibrium is at point 3, 
with wages and profits again equalized between locations, but 
with the city somewhat smaller. Profits decrease in both 
locations: in the city because of lower agglomeration benefits 
and the direct costs of terrorism, in the nonurban area because 
land rents are bid up. Hence, even though the direct effect of 
ππ ππ ′
Terrorism in cities can directly affect firms 
through an increase in the cost of doing 
business, and affect workers through an 
increase in the perceived risk of living 
and working there.
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The Effects of Terrorism on Firms in Large Cities
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terrorism is localized, the indirect economic effect is 
ubiquitous because of firm and worker mobility.
However, agglomeration forces are still present, and 
location A remains big despite the terror tax, which causes 
some firms to leave location A for location B. The fact that 
gains to agglomeration still exist implies that one location is 
bound to have more firms and workers. Another way to say this 
is that an agglomeration rent exists in the city: even if the 
profits of firms in the large city are hit by a permanent increase 
in costs, most firms will want to stay to benefit from labor 
pooling. However, if the increase in costs is large enough, and 
the consequent shift of the  curve is large enough, then the 
terror tax will cause so many firms and workers to leave the city 
in location A that the benefits of labor pooling will dry up, and 
the city will no longer have an economic rationale.
To illustrate this point, we construct a simple numerical 
example. We choose parameters such that in the initial 
situation, with no terrorism threat, some stylized facts in urban 
economics are replicated (see appendix). The labor pooling 
gains are large enough that the equilibrium share of firms and 
workers ( ) in the city is 80.5 percent, which is roughly 
the urbanization rate in the United States. The share of labor 
income in GDP is two-thirds and the land rent in the city is ten 
times the land rent in the nonurban area.7 This ratio in land 
prices is a measure of the agglomeration rent, or extra profit to 
firms from being in the city: it reveals that firms are willing to 
pay rents that are ten times higher in the city in order to benefit 
from the presence of other workers and firms.
ππ
λF λL=
We look at different scenarios of permanent increases in the 
costs of doing business in the city. An important point is that 
these are not the costs of fighting terrorism at the federal level, 
which presumably are financed by all agents in the economy, 
but are the added costs of doing business in the city that do not 
affect firms in the nonurban areas.
We find that a permanent 1 percent terror tax for all firms 
in the city has little effect: the share of workers and firms in the 
city falls from 80.5 percent to 80 percent.8 The main adjust-
ment comes in the form of a decrease in the ratio of land rent 
in the city to the nonurban area, from 10 to 7.5. This adjust-
ment in prices is clearly a stabilizing factor for the city as it 
retains firms. Hence, the agglomeration rent decreases but 
it remains very large. A 5 percent terror tax has a more 
pronounced effect, as  decreases to 76.3 percent and 
the ratio of land prices falls to 6. In the numerical example, a 
7 percent terror tax causes the city to cease to exist, as firms 
leave the city followed by workers. At that level, the terror tax 
is large enough to offset the gains from labor pooling in 
equilibrium, and firms and workers disperse across space to 
avoid the tax. (Nevertheless, we argue below that such a large 
increase in costs that would fall entirely on the city is very 
unlikely.)
Thus far, we have assumed that the effect of a terrorist threat 
on cities operates through the increased costs that firms have to 
pay. But another effect of terrorism—and perhaps the one 
λF λL=
most desired by the perpetrators—is fear. Fear of terrorism 
may cause more than sleepless nights if people act on their fears 
by fleeing the city for locations perceived to be safer. Accord-
ingly, it is reasonable to examine the effect that such fear has on 
cities in equilibrium.
We model fear by supposing that workers are no longer 
indifferent between locations as long as wages are the same: at 
equal wages, they would rather be away from the city. Put 
differently, fearful workers demand a wage premium for 
working in cities because fear reduces the utility of living in the 
city.9 Contrary to the case where the direct effect of terrorism is 
on firms, here the  curve is not affected but WW is, and 
shifts to the left (Exhibit 5). The equilibrium moves from point 
1 to point 2 as both workers and firms leave the city. Profits in 
ππ
Even if the profits of firms in the large city 
are hit by a permanent increase in costs, 
most firms will want to stay to benefit from 
labor pooling.
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The Effects of a Perceived Decrease in Safety
in Large Cities
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both locations decrease because of the increase in wage costs 
for the firms in the city and the reduction in agglomeration 
gains. As in the case where firms pay a terror tax, the city 
becomes smaller. However, if the agglomeration gains are 
sufficiently large, the city does not disappear, because labor 
pooling implies that firms are willing to pay a wage premium to 
retain workers in a single location, the city.
As we did with the terror tax, we construct a numerical 
example to illustrate the equilibrium effects of fear. Using the 
same parameters as before, we look first at what happens if the 
utility of workers living in the city is decreased by a fear factor 
equivalent to 1 percent of the wage.10 The effects are found to 
be small: the share of workers in the city falls from 80.5 percent 
to 79.9 percent and the share of firms to 80 percent.11 A 
5 percent decrease in urban utility is found to have a larger 
effect: 76 percent of firms remain in the city and the share of 
workers falls to 75 percent. The city unravels abruptly when the 
fear factor rises to 7 percent of the wage: this exhausts the 
benefit to firms from labor pooling, and the economic rationale 
for the city is eliminated.
These numerical examples reveal a threshold effect of 
terrorism on the city. When the direct effect of terrorism on 
either the costs to firms or the peace of mind of workers is small 
enough, the equilibrium effect on city size is very small. But 
beyond a certain point (7 percent in both examples), the direct 
costs of terrorism have a catastrophic effect by wiping out the 
gains to labor pooling in the model, and the city loses its 
economic rationale. 
Our conclusion from the labor pooling model is that the 
effect of terrorism on cities is discontinuous. Any ongoing costs 
of coping with terrorism, however, can lead to a limited 
reduction in the size of the city. The worst-case scenario—
where the urban landscape ceases to exist—appears abruptly 
but only for large, permanent, increased costs of doing business 
in the city or for large increases in the perceived risk of living in 
the city. 
The Core Periphery Model
The labor pooling model abstracts from transportation costs, 
except for the implicit assumption that workers need to live 
close to their jobs. But moving goods across space is costly, 
and transportation costs increase with distance. These facts 
offer an alternative explanation for the formation of cities that 
is independent of the labor pooling model. In the case of 
transport costs, businesses want to be near their customers 
(which may also be other businesses), and workers need to live 
near their jobs. Because workers are also consumers, by coming 
together in a single location, firms can sell to each other as 
suppliers and to their own and each other’s employees as 
consumers.
To account for this interrelationship, we now apply a second 
model to the effects of terrorism on cities. The model we use, 
known as the core periphery model, is based on Fujita, 
Krugman, and Venables (1999). As with the labor pooling 
model, we begin with two a priori symmetric regions, and study 
the forces that might lead to a concentration of activity in one 
of the two regions (the technical details of the model can be 
found in the appendix).
Consider that each of two regions, A and B, is populated by 
an equal number of immobile workers, who we can think of as 
farmers.12 There are two sectors: agriculture and manufac-
turing. The manufacturing sector has many firms that produce 
different goods and is subject to increasing returns, and 
manufactured goods are costly to transport. In particular, 
firms are assumed to incur a fixed cost for every production 
location, which gives them an incentive to concentrate 
production in a single place. Each manufacturing firm wants 
to sell to customers in both locations, but because of transport 
costs, firms will want to concentrate production in the larger 
market, so as to minimize their total transport cost bill. Aside 
from farmers, who are unable to leave their birthplace, there 
are manufacturing workers who are free to migrate in search 
of the highest real wages. 
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The model has two forces that encourage agglomeration:
• Market access—firms want to locate in the larger market 
so they can service customers without paying transport 
costs.
• Cost of living—if nominal wages are equal in both 
locations, workers would rather live where there are 
more firms because the price index, which includes 
transport costs, is lower.13
There is also one force opposing agglomeration:
• Competition—this force becomes more intense as more 
firms locate in a region, so profits become lower. Firms 
want to avoid competition, which gives them an 
incentive to locate in the region with fewer firms.
In equilibrium, the balance of these three forces depends on 
the detailed parameters of the model: agglomeration may be the 
only stable equilibrium, or it may not be an equilibrium at all. To 
see how the model works, it is helpful to begin by thinking about 
extreme cases. When it comes to very low transport costs, 
agglomeration is irrelevant and there is no reason for cities to 
exist at all, so half of all economic activity will be in each location. 
With very high transport costs, the benefits to firms of 
concentrating production in a single location are outweighed by 
the prohibitive costs of selling in distant markets; as a result, 
firms produce in both locations and there is no agglomeration.
For intermediate levels of transport costs, which is the 
relevant real-world situation, there are two possibilities. The 
simplest scenario is the one where a city is inevitable: it will 
always pay for a worker to move to the location with more 
workers. Starting from symmetry, if one intrepid worker moves 
from location B to A, his wages will be higher, setting in motion 
a circular process that leads to a core periphery equilibrium, 
where all manufacturing is located in region A and where 
manufacturing wages are highest.
For our purposes, however, a second scenario is more 
applicable. Here, there are two locally stable equilibria, one 
symmetric (with half the manufacturers located in each region) 
and one core periphery. This scenario is illustrated in Exhibit 6, 
which shows  as before the share of mobile workers in 
location A along the horizontal axis and the difference in real 
wages between locations on the vertical axis. The WW curve 
depicts the relationship between the real wage gap, , 
and , and there are two locally stable equilibria, at  
(half of the mobile workers in each location) and at  (all 
mobile workers in location A). To see that these equilibria are 
locally stable, imagine a worker in either equilibrium who 
decides to move to the other city: that worker will experience a 
drop in wages and will return home, as indicated by the 
direction of the arrows.14
The model is silent about which locally stable equilibria the 
economy is likely to end up in, but the core periphery equilibria 
at  seems to be the relevant scenario for a world in which 
cities of unequal size coexist. Although the model is very 
simple, the core periphery equilibrium does have features that 
suggest the real world. First, there is circular causation in city 
formation: firms and workers want to be where other firms and 
workers are located. Second, wages are higher in the city, since 
 at . Third, some economic activity 
(manufacturing) is concentrated in a city while other activity is 
spread more evenly across space.
λL
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Because workers are also consumers, by 
coming together in a single location, firms 
can sell to each other as suppliers and to 
their own and each other’s employees as 
consumers.
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The Effects of Terrorism 
in the Core Periphery Model
The consequences of a onetime terrorist attack on a city in the 
core periphery model are similar to the effect in the labor 
pooling model: as long as the attack does not increase the 
ongoing costs of doing business in the city, there will be no 
long-run effect. The reason is that the underlying forces leading 
to city formation (a desire by firms to economize on transport 
costs) are unaffected by physical destruction of the city.15 
A continuing terrorist threat that imposes ongoing costs, 
however, may have different consequences. As we did in the 
labor pooling model, we model the effect of terrorism in the 
city as a terror tax borne by firms. This shifts the WW curve 
down. Somewhat surprisingly, the equilibrium effect of 
terrorism on city size is either zero or enormous. For relatively 
small shifts in the WW curve, wages fall but remain higher in 
the city and there is no migration. This reaction illustrates the 
existence of an agglomeration rent: in the initial equilibrium, 
workers earn a premium for living in a city, and there is room 
for this premium to be eroded without causing any change in 
the equilibrium.
However, if the shift in the WW curve is large enough so that 
wages are lower in the city when the city exists (  at 
), workers will start to leave the city, and the city will 
begin a vicious circle: as more workers and firms leave the city, 
the wage disadvantage persists, and the circular causation 
process goes into reverse (Exhibit 7). The new equilibrium is at 
, where firms do not benefit from agglomeration but 
(by assumption) face no differential risk of terrorism because 
they are located in a city.
A striking aspect of this scenario is that even if the terrorist 
threat recedes, so that the WW curve returns to its original 
position, the dispersed equilibrium will persist. The reason is 
that, as noted above, there are two locally stable equilibria and 
the economy will tend to stay wherever it finds itself. Once the 
core periphery equilibrium is destroyed, it will not reappear. In 
such a case, the economy would be in a worse equilibrium than 
the one in which it began, with the efficiency gains of 
agglomeration permanently lost.
To offer a sense of the likelihood of the two possible scenar-
ios, we present a numerical example. We choose parameters 
that imply markups of price over cost of about 25 percent, 
a share of goods in consumption of about 40 percent, and a 
level of transport costs (70 percent of sales value) that implies 
that there are two locally stable equilibria. This level of 
transport costs seems high at first glance, but it is more 
wA wB– 0<
λL 1=
λL 0.5=
reasonable when nontradable goods such as most services are 
taken into account. 
Beginning from a situation where the economy is in a core 
periphery equilibrium, we find that a terror tax of 1 percent or 
5 percent of total costs has no effect on agglomeration: workers 
in the city are unhappy compared with the days before 
September 11, but are not unhappy enough to abandon the 
city. The critical value of the terror tax is 6.3 percent: if firms 
have to pay more than this amount to counter the effects of the 
ongoing threat of terrorism, they can no longer offer workers a 
wage premium for living in the city and workers will begin to 
move away, setting the vicious circle in motion. Interestingly, 
this critical level of the terror tax is close to the critical level of 
7 percent found in the numerical examples of the labor pooling 
model.
In general, the vicious-circle scenario for the city is more 
likely to occur if the initial real wage advantage of residents is 
small, so that even a fairly small increase in costs in the city can 
tip the balance away from it as a place to work, starting the 
reverse cumulative process. Although this scenario seems 
extreme and is not likely to apply to New York City as a whole, 
it does make the general point that short-term disruptions to 
the benefits of agglomeration may have very long-term 
consequences.
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Cities Are Unlikely to Disappear 
in the Face of Terrorism 
We have presented two models in which an ongoing terrorist 
threat might jeopardize the existence of cities. The numerical 
examples used in the models, which we chose to reflect some 
of the relevant features of the U.S. economy, suggest that an 
ongoing terror tax (that is, higher costs paid by urban firms 
and residents that have no economic return) in the range of 
5 percent to 10 percent might be enough to dissipate the 
economic rationale for the continuing existence of cities. 
We should note that, despite their overall usefulness as 
measures of the vulnerability of New York or other cities, our 
numerical simulations probably understate the resilience of 
urban life substantially for the simple reason that each model 
examines just one motive for agglomeration in isolation. And 
although it is not possible to carefully analyze together all of the 
economic reasons why cities exist, it seems likely that cities are 
in fact much more robust than our models—which consider 
only one force at a time—suggest.
It is also worth noting that the level of terror tax that might 
cause cities to decline, as identified in our models, is far higher 
than anything that the war on terrorism thus far suggests is 
plausible. First, most of the costs discussed elsewhere in this 
volume (Hobijn 2002) are borne by the nation as a whole and 
are not disproportionately burdensome to New York or other 
cities. As a result, they are not an urban-specific terror tax of 
the kind that we analyze.
Nevertheless, one element of costs that does closely match 
our theoretical notion of a terror tax is insurance premiums, 
which can be expected to be disproportionately higher in New 
York as long as the threat of terrorism persists. The midyear 
outlook, published by Standard and Poor’s in May 2002, 
reports that since September 11 “large commercial property 
insurance is commonly seeing rate increases of 50 percent-
60 percent, with some policies exacting 200 percent-
300 percent, along with more restrictive terms and conditions.”  
These are large increases, and in New York some firms cannot 
buy insurance against the risk of terrorism at any price 
(Standard and Poor’s Insurance 2002). However, insurance 
premiums do not constitute a large share of total costs. In a 
1995 survey by the consulting firm Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 
insurance premiums were reported to be 0.25 percent of the 
revenues of large firms (with more than $100 million in 
revenues). The amount is likely to be larger for smaller firms. 
For small and large firms combined, the burden of higher 
insurance premiums is estimated to be between 0.25 percent 
and 0.50 percent of firms’ total costs. Yet even this small 
amount overestimates the urban insurance burden, because it 
does not measure the differential increase in costs between New 
York and the rest of the country.
Another element of costs specific to New York City is the 
ongoing disruption to transportation as a result of security 
delays and the destruction of the World Trade Center’s Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) train station. There is no 
way to estimate the costs of ongoing security-related delays at 
bridges and tunnels and the like, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the costs are not large. Bram, Haughwout, and 
Orr (2002) calculate that the time cost of a longer commute for 
former users of that PATH station is approximately 
$100 million per year, which is just 0.1 percent of gross city 
product.
Another way to think about the magnitude of the terror tax 
is to consider the actual dollar costs of September 11. Bram, 
Orr, and Rapaport (2002) estimate the value of wage losses 
associated with September 11 to be up to $6.4 billion and the 
value of physical destruction to be $21.6 billion. The size of 
New York’s economy in 2001 is estimated to be between 
$381 billion (by the consulting firm DRI-WEFA) and 
$461 billion (by the New York City Office of the Comptroller). 
Assuming a 15 percent real rate of return on the destroyed 
capital stock (15 percent is roughly the aggregate rate of return 
on physical capital in the United States), the economic damage 
from the attack was on the order of 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent 
of the city’s annual economic output. Although smaller than 
the calculations from our numerical examples, 2.5 percent is 
not a small number, and it might conceivably be large enough 
to threaten the future of New York—if the burden was ongoing 
and was not offset by insurance and federal assistance. 
However, as Bram, Orr, and Rapaport point out, most of the 
financial cost of September 11 will be covered either by private 
insurance or by federal assistance. Thus, the viability of urban 
life would be threatened only if all of the following conditions 
existed: firms were unable to obtain private insurance, the 
One element of costs that does closely 
match our theoretical notion of a terror tax 
is insurance premiums, which can be 
expected to be disproportionately higher 
in New York as long as the threat of 
terrorism persists.
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nation offered no financial assistance in the event of an attack, 
an attack of the destructiveness of September 11 was expected 
to occur every year, and the balance of forces that sustains 
agglomeration is even more fragile than our numerical 
examples suggest. It is safe to say that such a scenario is 
not likely.
We reiterate that our theoretical analysis of the terror tax 
suggests that only costs that are ongoing and specific to cities 
can diminish the powerful economic rationale for urban 
agglomeration. All available evidence suggests that the current 
size of the terror tax is small and is surely not large enough to 
threaten the viability of New York or other large cities. 
Moreover, the logic and the numerical simulations of the 
models examined suggest that in the most likely case, where 
agglomeration gains are sufficiently large, the effect on the size 
of the city will be quantitatively very small. By construction, in 
the core periphery model, there is no effect at all. The labor 
pooling model suggests that a terror tax on the order of 
magnitude given above would have very little negative effect on 
the size of the city and that the adjustment would take place 
through a decrease in the difference in land rents between the 
city and the nonurban areas. This small effect is not surprising 
given the circular causality mechanism at work in the model: 
the very fact that most workers and firms remain in the city is 
the source of the benefit of locating in the city. This also reflects 
the very nonlinear effect of terrorism on cities. It either 
eliminates the benefits of agglomeration or has no effect on 
them. Our evidence points to the latter conclusion—that 
terrorism will have very little effect on the size of cities.
Is There a Role for Policy?
From the standpoint of the health of cities, our analysis 
suggests that the best thing that government can do is to defeat 
terrorism, so that cities are not targets and do not have to bear 
its ongoing costs. That having been said, our two models 
suggest that, absent an expensive ongoing threat, cities will 
recover from terrorist attacks because physical damage does 
not affect the balance of forces that leads to agglomeration. If 
the threat of terrorism recedes, the city will return to its former 
size without government intervention. But in the unlikely 
event that terrorism does persist with very large costs, this 
balance of forces may be threatened, and the health of cities 
may be at risk. Then, and according to the logic of the models, 
a modest subsidy to economic activity in the city would be 
enough to buffer the city against the threat of firms and 
workers leaving. In an application of the precautionary 
principle, some may reasonably argue in favor of such a small 
subsidy as insurance against a very low-probability event.
Nevertheless, although both of our models suggest that an 
urban-specific subsidy may offset any negative effects of the 
terror tax, such a policy may not be needed. As our study 
indicates, it is unlikely that New York City or other cities will 
require subsidization to prevent them from declining in the 
face of potential terrorism.
Conclusion
Some observers have expressed concern that the September 11 
attacks jeopardize both the present and future economic health 
of New York, Washington, and other major cities. In this 
article, we argue that the vitality of cities is unlikely to be 
diminished by the threat of terrorism. Rather, the forces that 
lead to city formation also enable cities to be highly resilient in 
the face of catastrophes such as terrorist attacks, because they 
constitute a force for agglomeration that is very difficult to 
overcome.
The two theoretical models that we examine suggest that the 
physical damage sustained from a single terrorist attack, 
despite its scale, is unlikely to represent a threat to the con-
tinued vitality of large cities. The effects of ongoing terrorist 
activity, however, are potentially greater, because the costs 
of dealing with terrorism can be viewed as a type of tax that 
may alter the balance of economic forces that leads to city 
formation. Although such a change in the attractiveness of 
doing business in cities may have a very modest effect, or no 
effect at all, there is at least the possibility that it could lead to a 
reversal of the circular causation that sustains the existence of 
cities.
Our analysis also suggests that cities in general, and New 
York City in particular, are highly unlikely to decline in the face 
of even a sustained terrorist campaign. Finally, our look at the 
data suggests that even a pessimistic view of the magnitude of 
the costs currently facing New Yorkers leads to the conclusion 
that the city’s economic vitality is not at risk.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we develop the math behind the models 
discussed.
The Labor Pooling Model
We use a modified version of a small model of labor market 
pooling that is introduced in Krugman (1991). We add to 
Krugman’s analysis a market for land as well as shocks and 
uncertainty, specific to the threat of terrorism, that are 
concentrated in cities. In this model, the force behind 
agglomeration of economic activities in cities is very close to 
the Marshallian theory that a pooled market benefits both 
workers and firms. Uncertainty at the firm level plays a major 
role in this theory, and this type of uncertainty makes cities 
attractive to firms and workers. 
The Basic Model
Suppose there are two locations, A and B; a total of N mobile 
firms; L mobile workers; and a given stock F of land in each 
region.  and  firms are located, respectively, in A and B. 
To simplify the scenario, we assume that firms, presumably 
because of the existence of high fixed costs, cannot have 
production sites in both locations. Firms are represented by a 
revenue function in which labor and land are the two 
arguments. As in Krugman (1991), we assume that the revenue 
function is the same in both locations, is quadratic, and that 
there are firm-specific shocks to the marginal product of labor:
(A1)
,
where , and c are positive parameters;  is the number 
of workers employed by the firm; and  is land used by 
firm .  is a firm-specific shock distributed normally . 
The last term in equation A1 reflects the negative impact of 
competition on revenues and is not different across locations. 
The shocks are uncorrelated across firms. Both the labor 
market and the market for land are competitive and firms set 
the marginal products of the two factors equal to their price, 
respectively, w and r. 
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This implies a labor demand and a demand for land from 
each firm:
(A3)
      .
For each location, both factor markets clear:
(A4)         ,
so that factor prices are given by:
(A5)
    .
Hence, the expected wage in a region depends positively on 
the number of firms in the region, but the variance of the wage 
depends negatively on that same number:
(A6)       .
The reason is that as shocks are uncorrelated across firms, 
the effect of a positive labor productivity shock on one firm on 
the equilibrium wage rate will be compensated by other firms’ 
negative shocks, the more so that more firms are located in that 
location. This is in essence a specific version of the Marshallian 
argument of labor pooling. The covariance of the wage with 
firms’ specific shocks also depends negatively on the number of
firms:     .
The equilibrium demand for labor from a specific firm 
depends positively on its shock and negatively on other firms’ 
shocks: 
(A7) . 
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Using the definition of profits as revenues minus factor 
costs, and equations A5 and A7, we can obtain the expected 
profits in each location:
(A8)
   .
Note that the expected profits in a location depend 
positively on the number of workers in that location. This is 
simply because the wage rate decreases in the supply of 
workers. The expected profit in a location has a more 
ambiguous relation to the number of firms in that location. On 
the one hand, more firms implies a higher demand for factors 
that bid up their price and lower profits (the first two 
arguments of equation A8). On the other hand, a larger 
number of firms makes wage rates more stable, which in turn 
increases expected profits, as profits are concave in the wages 
and the productivity shock (the last argument of equation A8). 
Hence, labor pooling generates, as long as shocks are not 
perfectly correlated across firms, a pecuniary externality that 
increases expected profits. Note that risk (specific to the firm) 
is the crucial element behind this externality that will play the 
central role in the tendency for agglomeration. 
The Location Equilibrium
Equations A6 and A8 give the expected wage and profit in each 
location. For a location configuration to be an equilibrium,  
both mobile firms and mobile workers must have no incentive 
to move. We assume that both must decide where to locate 
before shocks occur, which implies that expected wages and 
expected profits must be equalized across locations. We define 
 as the share of workers in location A and, 
similarly,  as the share of firms in location A. For 
expected wages to be identical, it must be that , so that 
the share of firms is equal to the share of workers. The reason is 
that if firms move to one location, the wage rate will increase in 
that location, attracting workers up to the point where wages 
are equalized. This is the first equilibrium relation, which we 
call the WW schedule.
The equilibrium relation that implies that expected profits 
are equalized is a bit more complex. Solving , we 
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obtain a second relation between  and , which we call the 
 schedule:
(A9)
.
It can be shown that, as long as it is continuous (that is,
 is not too high), the  schedule defines a positive relation 
between  and . If workers move to a location, they will 
decrease wages in that location so that firms will also move. 
However, this positive relation between the share of workers 
and the share of firms in region A is nonlinear because of the 
presence of firm-specific shocks (the labor market pooling 
effect) and the impact on the land market. If these two effects 
were absent , the location equilibrium would then 
be indeterminate.
An obvious equilibrium exists—the symmetric equilibrium 
 or the dispersed equilibrium. As usual in this 
literature, we can ask under which conditions this equilibrium 
is stable and under which conditions other equilibria exist, with 
one location arising as the main agglomeration with a majority 
of workers and firms.
Let us first consider the case where the symmetric equil-
ibrium is stable. Estimated at the symmetric equilibrium, the 
slope of the  schedule is:
(A10) .
Suppose first that the slope of the  schedule is less than 
the slope of the WW schedule. If we assume that workers move 
to the location with the higher expected wage, and that firms 
move to the location that offers higher expected profits, then 
the dynamics of the model are shown by the arrows in 
Exhibit 1. 
The symmetric equilibrium is stable in the sense that if firms 
change locations, profits will increase in the location from 
which they leave and decrease in the other location. The same 
would happen to wages if workers were to leave a location. The 
slope in equation A10 is less than 1 when:
(A11) .
Not surprisingly, no agglomeration process takes place 
when: 1) wages and rents in a location react strongly to an 
increase in demand by firms relocating to that location 
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(high , and F), and 2) when N and  are so small that 
the benefits of labor pooling for firms are small either because 
there are few firms to pool with or because the specific firms’ 
shocks are small. It can be shown that the inequality in 
equation A11 is the same one that implies that no other 
equilibrium exists. This scenario is depicted in Exhibit 2.
When the inequality of equation A11 is reversed, the  
schedule becomes steeper than the WW curve at the symmetric 
equilibrium and two other interior asymmetric equilibria 
appear, which are given by:
(A12) .
Hence, one of the locations becomes an agglomeration, 
which attracts most workers and most firms. The equilibrium 
is such that wages and profits are the same in both locations. 
From equation A5, one can see that the price of land is higher 
in location A than in location B. The difference in land price 
reflects the benefit from labor pooling in location A.
The dynamics of the model that exist when agglomeration 
forces are strong enough are depicted in Exhibit 3. It can be 
shown that the two asymmetric equilibria are stable. As is usual 
in models of new economic geography with multiple equilibria, 
the identity of the location that ends up being the agglomer-
ation is indeterminate. It can be interpreted loosely as the result 
of history and/or an initial small advantage. We choose 
location A as the location where most firms and workers 
concentrate.
Note that the higher the risk specific to firms (the higher 
), the more firms and workers will want to concentrate in 
one location only. Hence, increased uncertainty is not, in itself, 
a force that leads firms to leave the urban, densely populated 
areas. In fact, this simple model shows that because of market 
pooling arguments, it may lead to an agglomeration process 
making the symmetric equilibrium unstable, and it may  
increase the attractiveness of the concentrated area once the 
agglomeration process is achieved.
To consider the possible effect of terrorism on the structure 
of cities, we start from the assumption that such an 
agglomeration phenomenon has indeed occurred, exemplified 
by New York City, so that location A has most firms and 
workers and that this equilibrium is initially stable.
There are different ways to interpret the impact of the events 
of September 11 on cities in terms of our model: 1) as an 
unexpected, negative onetime shock to firms based in the 
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concentrated area, 2) as a permanent increase in expected costs 
in location A, the largest city, as future terrorist attacks might 
target this location (for example, because of the presence of 
financial markets, government activities, or other “symbolic 
activities”), 3) as a permanent increase in the disutility of 
workers who leave the concentrated location A, and 4) as a 
permanent increase in costs to firms as a function to the 
number of other firms in the same location.
An Unexpected, Negative Onetime Shock
In the first interpretation, and if we take strictly our 
assumption that the location choice is made before the shocks 
are realized, a onetime negative shock to profits in location A 
has no impact on location. Firms’ profits decrease in location 
A. If the shock also affects labor productivity temporarily, 
wages in location A will decrease. A onetime unexpected shock 
has an impact on profits and wages, but not on the location 
equilibrium that results from a long-term choice. Another way 
to say this is that a temporary shock does not affect the 
economic forces that explain the agglomeration process in the 
first place (that is, the parameters that explain the instability of 
the symmetric dispersed equilibrium), nor does it affect the 
extent of spatial concentration (that is, the parameters that 
affect the share of firms and workers in location A in 
equation A12).
A Permanent Increase in Costs in Large Cities
In the second interpretation, we assume that costs increase 
permanently in location A by an amount . This could be due 
to the fact that the threat of terrorism induces higher costs in 
terms of security and insurance. Using equation A9, we see that 
the  schedule then becomes:
(A13)
.
It can be shown that the  schedule is shifted downward 
and becomes flatter, and that  is always negative when 
evaluated at the “high” equilibrium, that is, in the equilibrium 
with concentration in location A. This is shown in Exhibit 4. 
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In this case, the equilibrium becomes less concentrated as firms 
leave location A for location B. However, agglomeration forces 
are still present, and location A remains the largest city despite 
the fact that due to the terrorism threat, the costs of firms have 
increased permanently. The fact that agglomeration gains (the 
labor pooling argument) still exist implies that one location is 
bound to have most firms and workers. In models of economic 
geography with multiple equilibria, history provides a strong 
advantage to the city with the initial concentration. This model 
shares this property. Another way to say this is that an 
agglomeration rent exists in the city: even if in the specific city 
the profits of firms are hit by a permanent shock to costs, most 
firms will want to stay to benefit from labor pooling. Of course, 
if the shock is large enough, that is, if the  schedule moves 
downward sufficiently, the equilibrium of concentration in 
location A could disappear. In this case, agglomeration would 
shift to the other possible equilibrium, location B. But the 
agglomeration gain derived from labor pooling would still 
imply an equilibrium with high concentration: another way to 
say this is that the symmetric equilibrium remains unstable. 
Note that profits also decrease in location B when location 
A experiences this permanent decrease in profits. To show how 
the adjustment takes place, we write the level of profits in A 
(we know that in equilibrium profits must be equal in B) as a 
function of the share of workers and firms in region A:
(A14) .
The first element of the profit level is the one linked to labor use 
by the firms. In equilibrium, we know that , so that the 
permanent increase in costs through  does not alter profits in 
an indirect way through labor use and wages. The reason is that 
as firms leave location A, workers also leave, so that wages are 
unaffected. The second element is linked to the agglomeration 
benefits that come from labor pooling. As  decreases due to 
the increase in , these agglomeration benefits also decrease, 
which puts further downward pressure on profits in location A. 
The third element is linked to the cost of land. As firms leave 
location A, that is, as  decreases, the demand for land 
decreases as well as its cost. Hence, this mitigates the fall in 
profits in A.
In location B, for the same symmetric reasons, wages are not 
affected, the agglomeration benefits of labor pooling increase, 
and land costs increase. In equilibrium, the cost-of-land 
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increase in location B must be large enough to more than 
compensate for the positive effect of the labor pooling 
mechanism on profits.
To infer the transitional dynamics implied by the 
permanent increase in costs in location A, we retain the 
assumption that firms move with profit changes and that 
workers move with wage changes. In this case, when costs to 
firms rise, profits decrease and the equilibrium goes from 1 to 
2 (Exhibit 3), so that firms leave the large city. This decreases 
wages in the city and leads workers to follow the firms at 
point 3, which can be considered the long-term equilibrium. 
Note that there is an amplifying effect due to the interaction of 
firms and workers. More firms leave in the long term than in 
the short term (  is lower at point 3 than at point 2): the 
reason is that as workers leave city A, labor supply goes down 
and wages increase. This leads more firms to move as labor 
costs increase in city A.
Note that in this interpretation, wages are not affected in the 
long-term equilibrium but decrease in location A in the short 
term. If firms move first and workers second, wages will 
overshoot downward in the short term in location A and then 
increase back to the initial level.
The fact that wages do not change in the long term may 
not be true if some of the labor pooling mechanism were to 
increase labor productivity and therefore the demand for 
workers. In this case, wages would be negatively affected in the 
long term by the fact that firms and therefore workers become 
less spatially concentrated.
The numerical example described in this article uses these 
parameters: ,
. With these parameters, both the 
average wage and productivity and its variance at the firm level 
are 0.5.
A Permanent Increase in Perceived Risk
to Agents in Large Cities
Up to now, we have assumed that agents, when choosing where 
to live, only care about wages. Obviously, this does not take 
into account other important aspects of location choice. The 
concern for safety should be an important one, and one way to 
interpret the events of September 11 is that the perception of 
safety has decreased permanently in large cities. Suppose we 
now assume that agents equalize utility rather than wages, and 
λF
L 10 N 5 σε
2
0.5= µ 2 γ 0.4 F 0.7=,=,=, ,=,=
β 1.3 δ 1.5 c 0.19=,=,=
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that utility is simply the wage minus a risk parameter (call it 
), which was permanently increased in New York City after 
the attack. City A becomes a perceived target because it is the 
biggest city but also presumably because of other specific 
factors such as the presence of financial markets. Hence, the 
WW schedule is now changed. It becomes:
(A15) .
There is still a positive relation between  and , which 
is given in Exhibit 5. As the WW schedule shifts up from “zero 
risk” to the schedule with the specific risk associated with city A 
perceived by agents, the equilibrium is such that both workers 
and firms move out of the city. The equilibrium shifts from 
point 1 to 2 in Exhibit 5. The dynamics are such that as workers 
move out of the large city, wages increase there with a negative 
effect on profits, so that firms also move out. Note, however, 
that in equilibrium, the share of firms in the big city is larger 
than the share of workers, so that wages are higher in city A 
than in city B. The difference in wages is the risk factor. The 
reason for this is that to retain workers in city A, firms must pay 
higher wages there. However, utility decreases in both 
locations. 
The increase in wages has a negative effect on profits. It can 
be shown that firms’ profits decrease in both locations. This 
comes from higher wages in the big city and also from the fact 
that the gains from labor pooling have declined with lower 
concentrations of workers and firms in the big city. From that 
point of view, economic geography becomes less efficient, as it 
was in the previous case.
Again, a large enough shock could make the big city 
“disappear” and reappear in location B. If we exclude this 
unlikely scenario, the important conclusion to draw is that 
because the threat of terrorism does not eliminate the labor 
pooling gains, the symmetric equilibrium with dispersion will 
not emerge as a stable equilibrium and city A will remain the 
location with most firms and workers.
An Increase in Costs Linked to Industrial 
and Population Density
In the previous interpretations of the economic effects of 
September 11, the increased risk factor either to firms or agents 
was specific to a city, city A in our example. We now analyze 
RA
λF
2NRA λF γL NRA–( ) γLλL–+ 0=
λF λL
how the results differ when the effect on firms’ costs is linked 
not to a specific city but to the density of the location, based on 
the idea that cities with more firms are more likely to be the 
target of terrorist attempts. Hence, we now assume that profits 
are given by:
(A16)
; .
The condition that expected profits and expected wages are 
equal across locations still determines the location equilibrium. 
The symmetric equilibrium with  is a possible 
equilibrium. The  schedule has the same form as before but 
is flatter, as its slope, when estimated in the symmetric 
equilibrium , is now:
(A17) .
The fact that locations with a higher share of firms are more 
likely to be targeted and therefore see the costs of doing 
business increase is similar to a congestion cost.16 This 
interpretation is different from the one in the previous section, 
where the terrorism threat did not alter the fundamental 
benefit of being spatially concentrated. In this interpretation, 
the two equilibria with spatial agglomeration could disappear 
and the dispersed equilibrium could become the unique stable 
equilibrium if the expression in equation A17 becomes less 
than 1. In this case, Exhibit 2 would become the valid 
description of the equilibrium.
This interpretation of September 11 basically says that the 
benefits of labor pooling (and others not modeled here) would 
be overcome by the congestion cost linked to increased 
security, itself linked to the share of firms in the city. In this 
interpretation, a small negative shock to the large city would 
make firms leave. This would depress wages there and lead 
workers to move out. As firms leave the city, the gains from 
labor pooling unravel and the dispersed equilibrium with two 
cities of equal size becomes the unique stable equilibrium. For 
such a scenario to become possible, the cost linked to the 
terrorist threat in a city needs to increase strongly with the 
share of firms in that city:  must be high enough. 
In this case, spatial dispersion becomes an insurance device.
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A close analysis of the preceding scenario would interpret 
the threat of terrorism as a decrease in the variance of firms’ 
specific shocks relative to shocks specific to a location, which 
affects all firms. In this case, the very benefits of spatial 
agglomeration (at least those of labor pooling) would be 
reversed: the insurance mechanism that led firms to 
agglomerate would lead them to disperse.
In the scenario in which the increase in costs to large cities is 
not enough to make the symmetric equilibrium a stable 
equilibrium, the analysis is similar to the one in this article. The 
large city loses firms and workers to the smaller city but 
remains the location with the majority of firms and workers. 
The analysis would be similar in the case where the cost affects 
workers rather than firms.
The Core Periphery Model
Our second model, the core periphery model of Fujita, 
Krugman, and Venables (1999), offers one explanation for 
agglomeration. The ingredients of the model are two locations, 
each endowed with an equal amount of an immobile factor 
(the authors call this factor agricultural labor). There are two 
goods in the model: a numeraire, produced under constant 
returns and traded freely (the agricultural good), and a 
differentiated manufactured good, produced under increasing 
returns with monopolistic competition modeled à la Dixit-
Stiglitz. Unlike the labor pooling model, the core periphery 
model is a general equilibrium model, where all agents 
maximize and all markets clear.
Shipping costs for manufactured goods are modeled as an 
iceberg. This means that to deliver one unit to the other region, 
a manufacturer must ship  units,  of which “melt” in 
transit. In addition, firms in the big city must pay an iceberg 
“terror tax,” : to produce one unit of a good that can be 
sold, each firm must spend  units of output on security, 
insurance, and associated inefficiencies. 
Introducing some necessary notation, we give the statement 
of the model by way of a system of eight equations:
(A18)
(A19)
T 1> T 1–
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2
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(A20)
(A21)
(A22)
(A23)
(A24)
(A25) .
This is less imposing than it looks at first, although the 
model can only be solved numerically. Equations A18 and A19 
give income in each region, which is composed of labor income 
from manufactured workers plus the wages of agricultural 
workers. The total number of manufacturers, and the share of 
manufactured goods in Cobb-Douglas utility, is . The share 
of mobile workers located in region A is , and  is the 
nominal wage in region . The number of 
agricultural workers in each region is 1/2.
The next two equations define the price indexes for 
manufactured goods in each region, , and are derived from 
a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility function with 
parameter  and the assumption of iceberg transport costs.
The nominal wage equations A22 and A23 are a conse-
quence of the zero-profit equations for manufactured goods. 
Finally, equations A24 and A25 give the definition of real 
wages, , in each location; recall that agricultural goods have 
a price of 1 and a weight of  in the utility function of 
workers.
The equilibrium division of labor across regions is what the 
model aims to explain. Since the manufactured good is costly 
to ship between regions, firms will want to locate near their 
customers. If one region has more firms than the other, then 
the cost of living will be lower there because fewer goods incur 
transport costs, which makes it an attractive place for workers 
to locate. These two forces for agglomeration are called the 
“market access” and “price index” effects, respectively. They 
are balanced by a force that favors dispersion—that is, firms 
prefer less competition, which gives them an incentive to locate 
away from other firms.
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We model terrorism in the city as an increase in the cost of 
doing business there. To see how this affects equilibrium 
agglomeration, start in the core periphery equilibrium and 
consider an increase in  from its initial level of 1. The model 
is analytically intractable, but we can illustrate numerically the 
result that you would expect: a small increase reduces the real 
wage gap between the city and hinterlands but does not 
overturn it, while a larger increase reverses the real wage gap 
and causes the city to cease to exist.
In particular, consider starting at the core periphery 
equilibrium with , , and . With  
(the September 10 equilibrium), workers in location A get a 
real wage premium of 0.02. If we increase the tax to , 
the real wage premium falls to 0.004, and if we increase the tax 
to , the real wage gap becomes -0.012. So a terror tax 
of 5 percent has no effect on agglomeration, while a 10 percent 
tax causes location A to spiral downward, which only stops 
τ
T 1.7= σ 5= µ 0.4= τ 1=
τ 1.05=
τ 1.10=
when . With these parameters,  is a stable 
equilibrium, so even if the terror tax is removed, location A will 
remain no larger than B if the terror tax was onerous enough to 
cause a disagglomeration.
Note that it is not terrorism per se that causes people to leave 
the city; rather, it is the loss of the economic rationale for 
agglomeration that causes workers and firms to disperse. In the 
presence of a terror tax, the benefits of agglomeration (market 
access, cost of living) are counteracted: the tax reduces the 
effective size of the market that firms can access and raises the 
cost of living for workers. Note, though, that the cost of living 
also rises for workers in the hinterlands, since they must now 
pay the terror tax on goods that they import (along with the 
usual transport costs). So, for a given distribution of firms, the 
relative cost of living does not change, but the smaller effective 
market size in the city reduces the nominal wage gap between 
city and hinterland labor.
λ 1 2⁄= λ 1 2⁄=
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1. Although distance does not matter for some financial transactions, 
it still matters for others. For example, Petersen and Rajan (2000) 
show that most bank lending still occurs over fairly short distances, 
although the average distance between lender and borrower has 
increased over time.
2. Gaspar and Glaeser (1998) offer another reason why there may be 
agglomeration of producers of weightless goods, such as financial 
services and software. They argue that information technology may be 
a complement to, rather than a substitute for, face-to-face interaction, 
so that greater ease of electronic communication increases the 
incentive to locate near other producers.
3. Although we concentrate on the labor pooling and increasing 
returns/transport costs motives for agglomeration, we acknowledge 
that there are other economic explanations for city formation. The 
most well-known is the spillover model, set out most thoroughly in 
Henderson (1988). In Henderson’s model, agglomeration raises the 
productivity of firms that locate near other firms in the same line of 
business.
4. This is purely a simplifying assumption. If workers also disliked 
uncertainty, our results would actually be stronger. We return to the 
issue of workers’ risk-aversion in our discussion of the effects of 
terrorism.
5. There is also a mirror-image equilibrium where , but 
we omit it to simplify the analysis.
6. We do not assume that the smaller city is free from the threat of 
terrorism, nor do we assume that the terror tax falls to zero once firms 
cross the city limits. Our analysis simply supposes that the tax is higher 
in big cities than it is elsewhere.
7. From Haughwout and Inman (forthcoming), it is possible to infer 
that a lower bound for this ratio is around 7. For New York City, it is 
much higher. The results are not very sensitive to this inference.
8. Profits decrease by 0.2 percent in both locations, as does 
economywide GDP. The impact on profits and GDP is less than the 
λF λL= 1 2⁄<
direct effect on costs because firms can and do take advantage of the 
alternative location where they can avoid the terror tax. 
9. More precisely, we assume in this case that workers equalize utility 
across locations. Utility is the wage minus the fear factor.
10. The fear factor should not be interpreted here as the loss due to 
terrorism felt by all in the country. In a much narrower sense, it is the 
difference of utility due to a future terrorism threat perceived by those 
living in the city.
11. The wage increases in the city by 0.2 percent and decreases in the 
nonurban area by 0.4 percent. Profits decrease in both locations by 
0.8 percent. In the city, this occurs because of higher wages and lower 
agglomeration gains; in the nonurban areas, it occurs because of 
higher rents. The ratio of rents between the two locations decreases 
from 10 to 7.4. Again, this is a stabilizing factor for the city.
12. Regions A and B in this model differ from those in the labor 
pooling model.
13. Residents of large cities, particularly New York, may disagree with 
the notion that the cost of living is lower in these cities. Here, we 
abstract from land and housing prices, and interpret transport costs 
broadly to include the costs of consuming a wide variety of goods. For 
goods that are available only in the city (such as fine restaurants and 
unique entertainment), their cost for those outside the city includes 
airfare and hotel bills.
14. There is one other equilibrium between   and  
where the real wage gap is zero, but it is unstable.
15. This is the interpretation of the post-war Japanese experience 
offered by Davis and Weinstein (forthcoming).
16. If we were to make this cost a function of the share of workers in 
each location, the qualitative results would be similar.
λL 0.5= λL 1=
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